Monday, January 4, 2010

The Fire Behavior Forecast website for the Southwest Area is currently only being periodically maintained. All automatically updating graphics and links, and there are a bunch of them, are currently up-to-date. You can visit the site at http://www.FBANServices.com.

Friday, January 1, 2010


NM communities listed as "at-risk" for wildfires

This KOB TV coverage is only one part of one district (Smokey Bear RD) of one jurisdiction (the Lincoln NF) in a much greater area with the same fuels problem right now. There are widespread much more threatening fuels problems elsewhere hereabouts stretching from all of Southern NM to the Big Bend of West Texas. This ole cowboy thinks this could be another one of those years like we have seen so many times before. And the windy season is just about to be upon us.

Tim

Posted by FireBehaviorServicesLLC at 18:35 0 comments
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Saturday, December 26, 2009

More Comments on the Texas Forest Service Problem

Yes, the problem. These folks (TFS) have made it very clear that they are going to do things their own way (described below) and to Hell with any of us who have a problem with that. What they seem to forget is that we (most of us) are still federal employees when we work for them and that all of their funding comes from FEMA, a federal agency. Then their threat becomes something akin to "if you don't like the way we do things in Texas then you just won't work here anymore" I absolutely agree with that: I will not work there anymore. The issue is safety both of the public and certainly of firefighters consigned to TFS on a temporarily suspended agreement that they will keep us safe with the nationally recognized SOP's, i.e. 10 and 18, LCES, Principles of Safe Flight, Anchor/Flank/Pinch, etc. "We do things different in Texas".

The proof that most of their supervisors are not remotely qualified (i.e. ICT2/3, OSC2, DIVS) to be supervising wildland fire operations is the fact that almost none of them go out of Texas on big league fire assignments elsewhere in the US. TFS writes their own redcards in-house with different standards/quals from the national interagency-recognized 310-1. They make up the job as they go when fire is on the land and the Regioanl Fire Coordinator is the defacto ICT2 onsite. But then he will tell you that Gomer from the local VFD is the IC. Gomer has in fact no quals whatsoever other than the buddy-buddy relationship both with the TFS RFD and with the very wealthy private landowners who cater to very wealthy bubbas who hunt to kill what he prides his property for. And American taxpayers pay for all of this.

And they are paying for a large, revolving cadre of retired federal folks who are hooked on the $$$ and the hotel rooms. The rest of us take questionable orders for low GS wages and sleep in the dirt at least half of the time.

BarkR is absolutely right regarding the confusion of dispatch and the perversion of ICS. Also, FEDS (liability insurer) has stated that since TFS is so far out of the envelope of SOP's that FEDS doubts that any liability case against any covered federal employee would find in favor of any of us working under TFS supervision.

We watched several federal employees get axed without recourse last Summer by TFS simply for stating the obvious and demanding a safer working environment. It seems to me that now the inevitable will be fatalities and/or injuries to get federal involvement in fixing this mess.

Get ready for your Waterloo, TFS. It is coming soon at the hands of much smarter people than you. We just hope you do not hurt anybody first.

Tejas No Mas

Various Thoughts on Texas Firefighting

Texas Firefighting
I have spent several tours in Texas the past 2 years and would offer the following food for thought.
Some Regional Fire Coordinators drive the tactics on a incident on an ad hoc basis. Their experience level and red card quals vary widely and often aren't commensurate with the influence they have on the tactics employed. A Dozer module off my Forest experienced a near miss that was a classic case of everyone involved stretching the envelope (RFC, TFL, the IA dozer operator). From the outside looking in, it appears that there was a deference to authority as opposed to expertise and a command structure that lends itself to that scenario. The incident should have been reviewed and to my knowledge wasn't. I don't believe that it is a "cover up" per se but surely is a missed learning experience for all concerned.
Dozing for Dollars
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Texas Dispatch
I concur with the assessment of BarkR and have held my comments for a long time.Safety, of course, is Numero Uno, and with knowledge of in the TX dispatch system, as well a TX Incident Command, it is time for a review.On a particular large incident in TX the National Team OSC1 requested a dozer, citing specific, expressly needed, purpose. The order was placed to TICC dispatch. TICC dispatch coordinator cancelled the order and advised no dozer would be ordered. This decision by TICC was questioned and it was stated that in spite of the express order by the OSC1 it would not be ordered. Within minutes a review was held, principal individuals in the ordering system were 'called to the office' and told that insomuch as they did not know what was going on behind the scenes it was not acceptable to question the decision made by dispatch. It was only later discovered that the TFS IC had a direct line to TICC dispatch and that is where decisions were made on orders in spite of what the IMT requested. When this was brought to the attention of the IMT, the consensus was 'their hands were tied'. This is just one example, among many I'm sure, of the total disregard of the ICS system, operational safety of the firefighters and total lack of understanding of incident management, that scream 'watch out' if you work fire in TX. Firefox
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Texas Dispatch
The Texas Forest Service recently dealt with a fire in South Texas (The Hopper Fire) where there were questionable tactics employed, especially as it applies to the use of dozers at the head of the fire. I do not know if this is the incident referred to in your recent postings or not (the date would have been around August 10 thru 13th or so).One result that came from their dealing with the situation was the "firing" of a well-qualified ATGS (Air Attack). That ATGS had raised the issues with the Texas Forest Service, but was "shot down" and demobed (by an assigned Air Ops Branch Director from another state forestry organization)... End of issue.... Or is it?There needs to be a National Dispatch Review (if there is such a thing) for Texas.Imagine out-of-state cooperators arriving in Texas:The Zone Dispatch, the Texas Interagency Coordination Center (TICC) is in Lufkin. Except Expanded Aircraft (and Expanded Overhead for those aircraft) is in the Emergency Operations Center in College Station, managed by the TFS TICC Coordinator (this is where the headquarters for the Texas Forest Service is located). But, the OFFICIAL State EOC, called the State Operations Center (SOC) for all other agencies (TxDOT, State Troopers, Emergency Mgmt, etc) is in Austin. But never mind those, as we have another layer, the Incident Management Team (IMT) located in Granbury, which handles all fire response for state lands in West Texas (and claims to be covering the entire state for state coverage). This is who you report to if you are an incoming resource coming to Texas. And you may be assigned to a local area that has a dispatcher to talk to at a 4th (or is that 5th) tier level dispatch office.Is this confusing?The Texas Forest Service TICC Coordinator moved from Lufkin to College Station, where they have a new title, but who is the TFS Center Manager now at TICC? There is a designated point-of-contact, but most would agree that the TFS Center Manager is that person that moved to College Station. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) had a Coordinator in TICC (Lufkin), but they recently moved to Corpus Christi to work out of their house, vowing to never return to Lufkin (this move was mysteriously approved by the FWS). So the only original Coordinator still at TICC in Lufkin is the USFS Coordinator. An interagency coordination center that has three Coordinators located in three separate locations? And then add the IMT that the TFS brings in to manage the fire organization in Texas, which processes orders and supervises dispatches and dispatchers like they are the Interagency Coordination Center. Many TFS employees are placed on Resource Orders under the IMT, and given ICS titles for doing their normal jobs. Many are given ICS assignments that are not their normal jobs.The IMT adds an extra layer of administration that actually adds to the costs of managing fires in Texas, and removes management from the local level. Dispatches of aircraft not requested (and specifically stated as being a safety issue by ATGS) are dispatched anyway by the IMT in Granbury. Resource assignments to local areas are decided by the IMT and College Station headquarters, often not requested by the local TFS office..I could go on and on, and I'm sure other folks could, too. I have not even touched on the 4th tier dispatch center system accepted as normal in Texas. It's a big state for one zone (OK, the miniscule Federal lands in west Texas are under the Southwest Region in Albuquerque, but the rest of Texas is under the TICC zone in Lufkin).I hope that helps explain the situation in Texas for those unfamiliar with the state fire organization and situation. BarkR

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Centralized Fire Today, Tomorrow and Forever!

This one of my favorite topics on wlf.com and that is our Line Officers. The story: The Forest Line Officers called for a major Monday morning conference call with all Chief Officers and Captains. The topic of the conference call was related to work environment, avoiding harassment, treating people appropriately and how to work together. Important topics in my opinion. When it was the Deputy Forest Supervisor's (A Line Officer) time to say something he started off by saying: "Well it's time for me to piss on this fire hydrant". OK, so I am thinking "open mouth, insert foot” immediately. Many on the call took offense to the comment, especially since they had just been preached to by the Forest Supervisor and Civil Rights Officer. It created such an uproar that the Forest Supervisor sent out the following memo to her District Rangers (Line Officers) asking them to forward her memo to all employees on the call (cop-out). For those on the Forest who did not receive the apology, here you go. For all, only one thing comes to mind in times like these: Centralized Fire Today, Tomorrow and Forever!Forest Supervisor memo:
All -- It was brought to my attention that during Monday's conference call on work environment, after I had left the meeting, Deputy Forest Supervisor Snip used an analogy related to dogs and fire hydrants, and some employees have expressed they were offended by this comment. Though I was not present to hear the comments, in keeping with my commitment to ensure a positive work environment for all employees, I have discussed this issue with Name Snip and advised him of the inappropriateness of the comment, and outlined my expectations of him and his conduct in the future. Name Snip expressed remorse for his comment, stated he recognized immediately he could have used a better choice of words, and in hind sight, wished he had addressed the comment immediately. Please share this information with your employees who were on the call, and express both mine and Name Snip apology for this poor choice of words. Thanks.Snip NameForest Supervisor
Snip National Forest? Wondering which Forest? Yep, you guessed it right! Using an analogy we can all relate to. If a Deputy Incident Commander had done something detrimental to the team, would the Incident Commander send out a memo to Command and General Staff telling them to forward this to those in your functional areas OR would he/she pull the team together for the apology, get everyone back on the same page, have some good communications and move on with the business at hand. I think you all know the answer to that. Line Officers are not built to manage fire service organizations. Propose of this post is to again display another example of how each day Line Management and Fire Management grow further and further apart. The two groups simply see things differently and have different approaches to work/life values and working relationships.
Signed,Centralized Fire Today, Tomorrow and Forever!

Thursday, December 3, 2009

This is a great couple of presentations that the Texas Forest Service needs to learn from. They do most of everything right on the edge and then explain later that "that is the way things are done in Texas". Not once did we see an After Action Review this year and we did see several people get "punished" for perceived transgressions related to being "overly cautious". In every case unsafe actions and the non-learning was caused by egotistical, unqualified TFS overhead.Shame on them!!
http://gacc.nifc.gov/rmcc/Risk Management 2009.pdf (and HERE in case the link is broken)
True Safety Lies in Learning
Learning is about seeing failure as part of a system.
Learning is about countermeasures that remove error-producing conditions so there won't be a next time.
Learning is about increasing the flow of safety-related information.
Learning is about…the continuous improvement that comes from firmly integrating the terrible event in what the system knows about itself.
www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/ppts/risk-management-2007.ppt (and HERE in case the link is broken)
"A system cannot learn from failure and punish supposedly responsible individuals or groups at the same time.” ~~ Sidney Dekker